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Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) are still 
considered to be new-born institutional 
investors, in international fi nancial markets, as 
well as innovative investment vehicles, despite 
their relatively long history. Several funds have 
been operating at a global level for more than 
fi fty years, however the number of those created 
after the year 2000 represents the majority of 
the total in existence. For many years, these 
state-run funds have been almost anonymous 
investors, existing in the shadows, maintaining 
a low profi le in the public eye. SWFs have been 
regarded as investment vehicles established 
in order to manage, in a rational and profi t-
oriented way, pools of national wealth for 
future generations. These funds gained public 
attention during the last fi nancial crisis, playing 
the role of investors of last resort for top global 
fi nancial institutions. Nowadays, SWFs are 
among the most important institutional investors 
in global fi nancial markets, and constitute a solid 
element in the architecture of the international 
fi nancial safety net. Similarly to other fi nancial 
institutions, Sovereign Wealth Funds possess 
huge amounts of capital. During the last decade 
the funds have doubled their assets under 
management, and, in spite of losses accrued in 
consequence of the last fi nancial crisis, by the 
end of 2014 these amounted to over 7 billion 
US dollars. What distinguishes them the most 
from other fi nancial institutions is the fact that 
they are owned, managed and controlled 
by sovereign states, have limited liquidity 
needs, a lower-than-market-average-level of 
redemption risk, a long-term, intergenerational 
investment horizon and relatively high risk 
tolerance. Sovereign Wealth Funds, because 
they are hybrid in nature, combine private 
sector methods of investment (e.g. coming from 
hedge funds and pension funds), with public-
sector goals determined by governments.
Given the high level of opacity in SWFs’ 
decision processing, the lack of transparency 
in their portfolio allocation, and their increasing 
capital involvement within a wide range of 
asset classes, a further understanding of 
the investment behavior of these state-run 
investment vehicles is sorely needed. In 
the last decade, several articles have been 
dedicated to analyzing the factors determining 
asset allocation among this group of investors, 
however there are issues which still need to be 
examined. One of the unanswered questions is 
the relation between purchasing equity stakes 
in companies, and changes in the fi nancial 
performance of a targeted fi rm. The empirical 
fi ndings have provided evidence that public 
companies, due to the fact that they cater to 
the interests of politicians and not only to their 
shareholders, are relatively less effi cient with 
comparison to sole private fi rms. Thus these 
funds are likely to have objectives different than 
obtaining the highest possible fi nancial return 
on an investment. In consequence, there are 
grounds to believe that companies owned by a 
SWF experience a reduction in their fi nancial 
performance. The main goal of this paper is 
to answer the question of whether investment 
from Sovereign Wealth Funds determines 
changes in corporate fi nancial performance.
This paper is part of a larger project aimed 
at understanding the fi nancial aspects of 
SWFs’ activity in emerging markets, especially 
as regards their investment practices and 
performance. Previous papers by the author 
have been focused on factors determining 
propensity to invest in companies listed on 
the Warsaw Stock Exchange and the Stock 
Exchange in Sao Paulo. This study contributes 
to ongoing research in the fi eld of studies 
related to fi nancial aspects of SWFs’ behavior 
by providing empirical evidence about the 
impact of SWFs’ investment in the corporate 
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fi nancial performance of targeted fi rms from 
the one of emerging markets in Central and 
Eastern European Countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized 
in the following manner: Section 1 provides 
theoretical background to the research by 
discussing the relation between institutional 
investor ownership and fi nancial performance 
of the company. Section 2 describes the 
methodology and data used in this study. 
Section 3 presents and discusses empirical 
fi ndings. The article concludes by pointing out 
avenues for future research.
1. Literature Review
1.1 Institutional Investment in Global 
Financial Markets
Privatization as a core government policy is not 
only well documented in economic literature, 
but has also been a key component of the 
transformation process in countries changing 
their economic format from one that is centrally 
planned to one that is market oriented. The 
issue of privatization is especially relevant to 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe, 
where from 1989 onwards, we can observe 
processes of massive retreat of states from 
many areas previously regarded a priori as 
state-owned and state-regulated. Moreover 
for several decades privatization along with 
deregulations in many sectors, has been the 
answer and the antidote given by leading global 
fi nancial institutions to developing economies 
experiencing budget, fi nancial or economic 
diffi culties.
However, looking at the global picture 
as a whole, we can fi nd evidence that over 
the 2001-2012 period governments acquired 
more assets through stock purchases than 
they sold through share issue privatizations 
and direct sales. The key factor that seems to 
explain these obvious contradictions is that the 
government purchases of equity have recently 
been conducted mostly by state entities acting 
as investors rather than owners. Much of this 
state investment was channeled through special 
investment vehicles – Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
and the vast bulk of stock purchases have been 
cross border transactions. SWFs have been 
buying non-controlling stakes in foreign and 
domestic companies in order to realize a long-
term fi nancial return, rather than to own and 
operate these businesses as state enterprises 
(Bortolotti, Fotak, & Megginson, 2014).
The rise and growth of Sovereign Wealth 
Funds refl ect a broader phenomenon of equity 
ownership concentrations within a group of 
institutional investors rather than in the hands 
of individuals. Today institutional investors 
hold around 60% of all publically listed stock 
in the United States, around 72% in Japan 
and around 89% in the UK (Çelik & Isaksson, 
2014). There is no commonly accepted 
defi nition of an institutional investor thus far; 
however in the broadest sense, “institutional 
investor” refers to three categories of entities. 
The fi rst group of institutional investors refers to 
traditional institutional investors and comprises 
pension funds, investment funds and insurance 
companies. The second group, labeled 
alternative institutional investors, consists of 
hedge funds, private equity funds, exchange-
traded funds and sovereign wealth funds. The 
third group are asset managers, who invest in 
their clients’ names (Çelik & Isaksson, 2014). As 
a group, institutional investors are regarded as 
a common feature of modern capital markets, 
playing the major role in the internationalization 
of fi nancial markets (Agarwal, 2009). 
Institutional investors assume an increasing 
role in global capital markets as well as the 
main force shaping the new fi nancial landscape 
(Mizuno, 2010). Given their size, estimations 
suggest that they account for more than half 
of global equity market value worldwide, and 
that when these investors act together, they 
can shape the fi nancial markets into the form 
they desire (Rogers, 2014). Foreign institutional 
investors are quantitatively a very important 
group especially in emerging markets (Frankel 
& Menkhoff, 2003), where they have become 
a signifi cant channel providing capital (Chang, 
Hsiao, & Tsai, 2013). This group of investors is 
growing fast in emerging markets, where SWFs 
still predominate as a source of long-term 
capital (Della Croce, Stewart, & Yermo, 2011).
Institutional investors as a whole, with 
Sovereign Wealth Funds playing a signifi cant 
role, are also the key element of today’s global 
economic and fi nancial landscape, which 
has been described as a fi duciary capitalism. 
This term, which was used for the fi rst time 
by Hawley and Williams, characterizes a new 
pattern of ownership in which institutions 
such as e.g. pension funds and mutual funds, 
own equity on behalf of others e.g. retirees 
or future retirees (Hawley & Willams, 1997). 
The fi duciary capitalism is typifi ed by highly 
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diversifi ed equity holdings by a large number 
of institutional owners, however holdings are in 
fact, concentrated in the hands of a relatively 
small number of the very largest entities – 
universal owners (Hawley & Willams, 2007). 
These fi duciary institutions, with the Norwegian 
Sovereign Wealth Fund being a leading 
example, are highly diversifi ed investors, 
holding portfolios that represent almost every 
asset class from almost every regional fi nancial 
market. Similarly to Sovereign Wealth Funds, 
other relatively new intuitions have recently 
become important equity owners alongside 
the more traditional investors, such as pension 
funds and investment funds. In a similar vein, 
Bortolotti et al. (2014) suggest that SWFs are 
the single most important expression of the 
force that can be called the rise of the fi duciary 
state. What makes this phenomenon especially 
signifi cant is the fact that the largest number 
of government equity purchases have been 
acquisitions in foreign companies, where a 
state purchaser has limited ability to exercise 
any sovereign regulatory or supervisory power. 
SWFs as state shareholders have no more 
authority to monitor target fi rm managers than 
do private investors, especially if they are 
politically constrained.
These developments have given new 
impetus to the discussion about the role of 
Sovereign Wealth Funds in publicly listed 
companies, with special emphasis on the 
relation between SWFs’ ownership, and the 
fi nancial performance of companies. Due to the 
fact that in terms of shareholding size, these 
state-run funds are very different from individual 
investors, a question arises as to whether 
institutional ownership infl uences a company’s 
fi nancial performance. The empirical fi ndings, 
so far, do not provide clear arguments that 
allow us to draw unambiguous conclusions on 
this issue.
1.2 Institutional Owners and 
the Financial Performance 
of a Company 
A large body of research suggests that 
governments usually have a negative impact on 
a fi rm’s fi nancial performance, which improves 
with privatization (Estrin, Hanousek, Kočenda, 
& Svejner, 2009; Sun & Tong, 2003; Shirley & 
Walsh, 2001). Sovereign Wealth Funds, due 
to their political connections, are likely to have 
objectives other than obtaining the highest 
possible fi nancial return. Hence, a company 
with a SWF as a shareholder might be relatively 
ineffi cient and experience reductions in their 
market value, because managers will cater also 
to the interests of politicians (Fernandes, 2014). 
In case of public-private ownership, empirical 
fi ndings of research suggests that such mixed 
ownership also has a negative impact on the 
value of the company (Shirley & Walsh, 2001; 
Borisova, Brockam, Sales, & Zagorchev, 2012). 
However looking at this issue from a different 
perspective it, is likely that SWFs may be able 
to increase their performance and the value 
of the companies they invest in by opening 
doors to new markets, and by helping them to 
market their products in their home markets. 
These state-run funds, due to their long-term 
investment horizon, can signifi cantly relax 
fi nancing constraints of fi rms, thereby allowing 
them to undertake promising investments with 
more distant payoffs. Thus, if such advantages 
are important, one possible outcome is that 
companies with SWF ownership become more 
effi cient and experience increases in their 
market value (Fernandes, 2014).
Similar conclusions to those presented 
above can be drawn from the next strand of 
literature that focuses on the relation between 
institutional investor ownership and the fi nancial 
performance of fi rms. The prediction that large 
institutional owners can have a positive infl uence 
on the value of the company arises from the 
assumption that these investors have an 
incentive to and can effi ciently monitor insiders, 
reducing the likelihood that insiders will make 
sub-optimal decisions (Navissi & Naiker, 2006). 
Woidtke (2002) fi nds that Tobin’s Q is positively 
related to the ownership proportion of the 
private pension fund. For public pension funds, 
such relations were negative. Similarly Cornett, 
Marcus, Saunders and Tehranian (2007) fi nd 
a signifi cant relation between a company’s 
operation cash fl ow returns and both the 
shareholding proportion and the number of 
investors, for those institutional investors less 
likely to have a business relationship with the 
fi rms. In a similar vein, the empirical fi nding of 
Yuan, Xiao and Zou (2008) suggest that equity 
ownership by mutual funds has a positive 
effect of fi rm performance. Elyasiani and 
Jia, analyzing the distribution of institutional 
ownership, have found that there is a positive 
relationship between company performance 
and institutional ownership stability (Elyasiani & 
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Jia, 2010). The empirical results presented by 
Hsu and Wang (2014) show that the increasing 
stability of institutional holdings is related to 
better company performance.
On the other hand, the literature provides 
evidence on the negative relationship 
between institutional ownership and company 
performance; e.g. the empirical fi ndings of 
Liang, Lin and Huang (2011) suggest that 
institutional shareholdings negatively affect 
fi rm performance. Also Charfeddine and 
Elmarzougui (2010) argue that institutional 
ownership has a signifi cant negative impact 
on fi rm performance as measured by a proxy 
for Tobin’s Q. Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-
Martín (2011), using a sample of the listed 
companies in Spain, present evidence that the 
relationship between institutional investors and 
fi rm performance is negative for the banking 
sector due to the fact that banks in pursuit of 
achieving profi ts have detrimental infl uence on 
company performance. In contrast, the other 
studies fi nd no signifi cant relation between the 
above-mentioned variables (Faccio & Laser, 
2000; Duggal & Millar 1999). Summing up, the 
impact of institutional stock ownership on fi rm 
performance is still unclear. 
While the motives of creating Sovereign 
Wealth Funds and macroeconomics profi ts 
for the domestic economy as well as for 
transparency and geopolitical concerns are 
well recognized in the literature (see e.g. Beck 
& Fidora, 2008; Sun & Hesse, 2009; Sedláček, 
2010; Quadrio Curzio & Miceli, 2010; Urban, 
2011; Jiránková, 2012; Ćusović, 2012; Castelli 
& Scacciavillani, 2012; Alhashel, 2015), many 
questions concerning the fi nancial aspects 
of funds’ activities still remain relatively 
unanswered. Moreover, the empirical results 
found in the literature are controversial with 
reference to the short versus the long term, as 
well as to investment and divestment issues 
which are relatively sparse, mainly due to 
diffi culties in obtaining comprehensive and 
systematic data (Heaney, Li, & Valencia, 2011) 
and information gaps (Ciarlone & Micelli, 2014).
Knill, Lee and Mauck (2012), looking at the 
at risk-reward performance of target companies, 
argue that SWFs do not bring benefi ts to the 
companies they invested in, as other institutional 
investors do. Fotak, Bortolotti, Megginson and 
Miracky (2008) fi nd evidence suggesting that in 
the long term these state-run funds are value 
destroying. Bortolotti, Fotak and Megginson 
(2013) argue that companies targeted by active 
SWFs tend to achieve an abnormal return over 
the long term, while companies targeted by 
passive SWFs tend to underperform. Dewenter, 
Han and Malatesta (2010) suggest that over a 
fi ve year investment horizon there exists mixed 
positive evidence on the relation between 
SWF ownership and the stock performance of 
targeted fi rms, which is consistent with Kotter 
and Lel’s (2011) fi ndings of zero-returns over 
the long run. There are other papers, however, 
that have found that SWFs bring value to their 
target fi rms. The empirical fi ndings regarding the 
stock performance of target companies suggest 
that there are positive abnormal returns around 
the day of investment announcement (Kotter 
& Lel, 2011; Fotak, Bortolotti, Megginson, & 
Miracky, 2008; Raymond, 2008). In similar 
vein, Fernandes (2011) argues that there is an 
SWF premium; companies with the fund as a 
shareholder have 10-15% higher values than 
comparable fi rms, ceteris paribus. Bertoni and 
Lugo (2014) fi nd that the Credit Default Spread 
(CDS) of target companies drops following 
a SWF’s investment. Fernandes (2014) 
provides statistically signifi cant evidence of 
both increases in a company’s value following 
SWF investments, as well as signifi cant 
improvements in operational performance.
Summing up, we can see that the spectrum 
of empirical fi ndings on the relationship 
between institutional investors and the fi nancial 
performance of a target company is very wide 
and dispersed. Additionally, previous research 
has been focused mainly on developed 
markets. Therefore, there is a need for deeper 
investigation, especially on emerging markets, 
to reach more robust conclusions.
2. Methodology and Data
2.1 Sample Selection
The sample initially comprised all companies 
listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Three 
restrictions were then applied. First fi nancial 
companies (e.g. banks, insurance and fi nancial 
companies) were excluded as they tend to 
have capital structures different from other 
companies. Secondly, the data base was 
restricted to companies that have been listed 
for at least one full year as of the end of 2013, 
to ensure that its performance and the capital 
structure are not signifi cantly affected by the 
new listing, which may have an impact on the 
interpretation of results. Finally, companies with 
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missing data have been excluded. The above 
criteria yielded a usable sample of 336 fi rms. 
Within this group, using a unique Sovereign 
Wealth Funds Institute database, 36 fi rms 
were identifi ed as targeted for investment by 
Sovereign Wealth Funds. The sample of Polish 
companies represents over 80% of the total 
companies from Central and Eastern European 
Countries that were chosen for investment in 
2013. The lack of data for previous years does 
not allow for the creation of panel data, so far. 
All fi nancial indicators characterizing listed 
companies have been obtained from Stock 
Ground, provided by Notoria Services.
2.2 Variables
The key variables of interest are measures 
of the fi rm’s performance: return on equity 
(ROE), return on invested capital (ROIC), 
return on asset (ROA), and Sovereign Wealth 
Funds` ownership in the company SWF. For 
SWF we used a dummy variable (SWF_1), 
and a variable representing the percentage of 
ownership rights (SWF_2). We also included 
over 1% of an ownership variable (SWF_3) to 
examine the presence of ownership effect after 
a certain threshold.
Cornett et al. (2007) argue that using 
operating performance measures may offer 
some advantages over Tobins’ Q. First, it 
is a more focused indicator of the current 
performance of the company, and unlike 
Tobins’ Q, it is not affected by price changes 
associated with the anticipated corporate 
takeover events or other growth opportunities. 
Second, Tobins’ Q may be more susceptible 
to endogeneity problems if investors chase 
growth stocks or recent market winners. 
Despite the abovementioned disadvantages, 
we included a variable P_BV representing 
price to book the value of the company. This 
allowed us to analyze the potential impact of 
SWF’s ownership in the company on its market 
performance.
In order to control the other possible 
determinants of company performance, which 
were not captured by the ownership variable, 
we also included some observed company 
characteristics as control variables. The control 
variables used in the study have been selected 
with reference to those employed in earlier 
empirical studies; variables that have been 
shown to be related to international investment 
choices (see e.g. Fernandes, 2011). We used 
the size of the company, its fi nancial leverage, 
annual stock return, and growth opportunities 
as the right-hand side variables. The descriptive 
statistics of variables are presented in Tab. 1.
The size of the company has a signifi cant 
however ambiguous effect on company 
performance. On one hand, larger companies 
can be less effi cient than smaller ones because 
of loss of control by top managers over 
strategic and operational activities within the 
fi rm. On the other hand, large fi rms may turn out 
to have better performance as they are likely 
to exploit economies of scale, employ more 
skilled managers and have the formalization 
of procedures (Kumar, 2004). We used the 
logarithm of total assets (SIZE) to control 
company size.
The cost of capital derived from leverage 
being used by the company can affect their 
fi nancial performance in different ways, 




































































Tab. 1: Descriptive statistics of variables
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including tax shield, a higher business operating 
risk and highest interest burden (Morck, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). Given this, including 
this variable (LEVERAGE) in the model seems 
to be reasonable. We measure leverage as 
the debt to asset ratio, which equals the book 
value of total debt divided by the book value 
of total assets. The lagged annual stock return 
of the company (PERFORMANCE) is likely to 
capture the market’s expectations on the future 
performance of the company, and therefore, to 
account for the possibility that SWFs only select 
companies with good performance to invest in, 
we included this variable in the model (Yuan, 
Xiao, & Zou, 2008). Therefore, after controlling 
for this variable, an observed positive coeffi cient 
on SWF is more likely to refl ect the effect 
of SWFs’ ownership on company fi nancial 
performance, rather the other way around. The 
next variable, growth opportunities (GROWTH_
OPP), refl ect the possibility that the fund prefers 
companies with a higher than average increase 
of sales, to invest in. Thus, to control for this 
variable, a sales growth rate is included, similar 
to that used by Elyasiani and Jia (2010) and 
Fernandes (2014).
2.3 The Model
In order to support a hypothesis about the 
relationship between SWFs’ ownership and 
the fi nancial performance of the company, we 
run regressions in which the company’s ROE, 
ROA, ROIC and P_BV were a function of 
various right-hand side variables, discussed in 
the previous section. The relationship between 
the investor’s capital involvement and the 
fi nancial performance of the company, however, 
as previous research suggests, is subject to a 
potential simultaneity bias. The institutional 
investors might be attracted to companies 
with a superior operating performance, 
and as a consequence of this, a positive 
association between investors’ ownership 
and fi nancial performance can be observed 
even if that ownership is not directly benefi cial 
to performance. To eliminate this potential 
simultaneity bias we employed several tools.
First, we used both accounting and 
market measures of the fi nancial performance 
of companies ones as left-hand variables. 
Secondly, we normalized a company’s ROA, 
ROE, ROIC and P_BV by the market-averages, 
which eliminated relations between relative 
performance and a fi rm’s characteristics. 
Thirdly, we included a lag variable refl ecting 
return on stock over the previous year, a lag 
variable of assets and a lag variable of growth 
opportunities. We also used a lag measure 
of SWFs’ ownership by one year. This lag 
mitigates simultaneity issues and allowed us 
to verify the hypothesis that SWFs ownership 
improves company fi nancial performance over 
the hypothesis that SWFs increase holdings 
in companies with better recent fi nancial 
performance. If SWFs do effect management 
decisions, and because of that have a positive 
impact on fi nancial performance target fi rms, 
they presumably would do so prior to the year 
of better performance, which is consistent with 
the use of a lag.
As a consequence of the adjustments 
described above, the equations of model 





where: Yi,2014 is ROE, ROIC, ROA and P_BV 
respectively (in the following regressions), and 
variable SWFi,2013 takes the form of SWF_1, 
SWF_2 and SWF_3 in each regression for a 
dependent variable, with ut as the means error 
term.
Additionally, for each of the dependent 
variables we also estimated regressions with the 
use of incremental left-hand variables to analyze 
the potential infl uence of SWF ownership on 
changes in fi nancial performance, rather than 
on the level of fi nancial variables. Selected 
estimation results, those arbitrarily chosen 
to present as best in terms of signifi cance of 
parameters and R2, are presented in Tab. 2 and 
Tab. 3. All estimations and calculations have 
been made with the use of STATA.
3. Empirical Findings and Discussion
Looking at the results collectively, we can see 
the mixed evidence of a relationship between 
Sovereign Wealth Fund investment and the 
fi nancial performance of companies. First, in 
estimations using the absolute level of indicator 
as a left hand variable, we observe a positive 
however not statistically signifi cant impact of 
investment, while in estimations using delta 
ROE, the relationship seems to be negative. 
In models: (4), (6) and (8), the variable SWF 
is statistically signifi cant at 5% and 1% 
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respectively, suggesting that SWF investment 
in t-1 year indicates the decrease of return on 
equity in the following year. The results are 
consistent with those presented by Knill, Lee 
and Mauck (2012).
Secondly, the presented empirical results 
suggest that variable SWF seems to be 
better in predicting changes of performance 
rather than an absolute level of indicators. 
This conclusion seems to be a promising and 
reasonable avenue for the future research. 
Thirdly, similar regressions (not reported) have 
been run with other variables representing the 
fi nancial performance of company, i.e. return 
on invested capital, return on assets, as left 
hand variables. The fi ndings do not provide 
any evidence to support hypotheses on the 
relationship between capital involvement of 
the SWF and the fi nancial performance of the 
company as well as a robustness test of this 
analysis. Among several explanations of such 
a situation, two might be especially important 
ones. First, a one year lag between funds’ 
investment and measuring changes in fi nancial 
performance of companies might not be enough 
for benefi ts of SWFs’ investment to be visible. 
At the present, due to the database, such a 
limitation can’t be overcome. Further research 
might also be based on panel data with a wider 
range of companies from different emerging 
markets. Secondly, SWFs as new investors in 
companies might infl uence managers to act 
differently with short-term fi nancial performance 
costs of this change.
As regards to other variables, the level of 
debt in the company, measured by leverage 
ratio, has a positive infl uence of ROE with a 
statistically signifi cant 1% level in all regressions. 
These results as consistent with a theory of 
fi nance that points out the positive impact of 
fi nancial leverage on the fi nancial performance 
of a company. The variable GROWTH_OPP 
hold only in Δ ROE regressions, which 
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R2 0.4049 0.6291 0.4023 0.6308
Observations 287 280 287 280
Source: own calculations
Notes: This table presents estimates of coeffi cients of the regression of ROE and Δ ROE respectively. Models (1) and (2) 
present results using a dummy variable for SWF investment that equals 1 if there is equity investment, and 0 otherwise; 
models (3) and (4) using a percentage of SWF ownership, models (5) and (6) using a percentage of large investment 
by the fund with threshold restrictions (over 1%). Models (7) and (8) present estimations with the use of backward- and 
forward-stepwise selection. All specifi cations use standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. In parentheses are 
t -statistics where a P-value is reported.
Tab. 2: SWF ownership and performance of the company (Part 1)
EM_3_2017.indd   182 7.9.2017   10:34:35
1833, XX, 2017
Finance
decreases the change of ROE in the following 
year. Analyzing the portfolio of products and 
the margin of sales seems to be the natural 
avenue for future research in order to answer 
the question on the above relationship.
The coeffi cient of variable SIZE is negative 
in all estimations, which suggests that the size 
of the company measured by the logarithm 
of assets, has a negative infl uence on ROE, 
however the coeffi cient holds statistical 
signifi cance only in models (1) and (7). Finally, 
the variable PERFORMANCE seems to have 
a positive impact on equity returns, suggesting 
that the return on a company’s stocks in the 
previous year infl uences the changes of return 
on equity the following year, however this 
hypothesis can’t be supported due to a lack 
of statistical signifi cance of coeffi cient in all 
regressions. The R2 is between 40.21% and 
40.49% for estimations with ROA as a left-hand 
variable, and from 61.33% to 63.09% in models 
with Δ ROE.
Contrary to the ambiguous and relatively 
weak result (in terms of statistical signifi cance) 
of the estimations based on the accounting 
measures of fi nancial performance, the 
estimations using the market variable P_BV 
seem to provide a relatively clear picture of the 
relationship between Sovereign Wealth Funds’ 
ownership and the fi nancial performance of 
the targeted company. In all eight models, the 
data suggests the positive impact of a fund’s 
ownership on price to book value of the fi rm. 
In four models, the coeffi cient of the SWF 
variable are statistically signifi cant with p = 1%. 
It may suggest that, ceteris paribus, companies 
with SWF as investors have higher market 
valuations in comparison to the companies not 
targeted by the fund. The obtained results are 
consistent with those presented by Fernandes 
(2014), however in this research the positive 
impact of ownership is not limited to the 
variable with threshold restriction. Similarly, 
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R2 0.4021 0.6309 0.3690 0.6133
Observations 287 280 287 280
Source: own calculations
Notes: This table presents estimates of coeffi cients of the regression of ROE and Δ ROE respectively. Models (1) and (2) 
present results using a dummy variable for SWF investment that equals 1 if there is equity investment, and 0 otherwise; 
models (3) and (4) using a percentage of SWF ownership, models (5) and (6) using a percentage of large investment 
by the fund with threshold restrictions (over 1%). Models (7) and (8) present estimations with the use of backward- and 
forward-stepwise selection. All specifi cations use standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. In parentheses are 
t -statistics where a P-value is reported.
Tab. 2: SWF ownership and performance of the company (Part 2)
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those regressions with deltas as the left-hand 
variables. Regression models (4), (5), (6) and 
(8) fi t a given set of data relatively well (R2 close 
to 99%).
Additionally, several estimations (not 
reported in this paper) were run using a 
different market indicator of a company’s 
fi nancial performance. In regressions with a 
market capitalization variable as well as with 
an enterprise value variable, the variable 
SWF_1 had statistical signifi cance, however 
the coeffi cients had a negative sign.
Summing up, the empirical fi ndings of this 
research along with previous analysis point to 
diffi culties in measuring the impact of Sovereign 
Wealth Funds’ ownership on fi nancial 
performance and the value of a company, 
especially with the use of accounting indicators. 
Furthermore, the market data for companies 
does not provide clear evidence on the nature 
of such a relationship. Thus the impact of SWF 
ownership on company performance seems to 
remain one of an unsolved puzzle in the fi eld of 
contemporary fi nance.
Conclusions
The motivation of this study was to shed some 
light onto the debate about the relationship 
between Sovereign Wealth Fund ownership 
and the fi nancial performance of the company. 
The empirical fi ndings of this research, 
although consistent with previous ones, does 
not provide clear evidence of the examined 
relation. However the impact of the fund on 
the company listed on the emerging market 
seems to be similar to the relation that can be 
observed in developed markets. Among issues 
for future research is the use of panel data 
and the conduction of a comparative study for 
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R2 0.3641 0.3466 0.3457 0.9894
Observations 289 289 289 289
Source: own calculations
Notes: This table presents estimates of coeffi cients of the regression of price to book value ratio (P_BV) and Δ P_BV 
respectively. Models (1) and (4) present results using a dummy variable for SWF investment that equals 1 if there is 
equity investment, and 0 otherwise, models (2) and (5) using a percentage of SWF ownership, models (3) and (6) using 
a percentage of large investment by the fund with threshold restrictions (over 1%). Models (7) and (8) preset estimations 
with the use of backward- and forward-stepwise selection. All specifi cations use standard errors corrected for heteroske-
dasticity. In parentheses are t -statistics where a P-value is reported.
Tab. 3: SWF ownership and price to book value of the company (Part 1)
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set. This analysis could provide a robust test 
on the relationship between a fund’s ownership 
and the fi nancial performance of fi rms that are 
of interest to the managers of companies as 
well to policy makers and researchers.
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Abstract
THE IMPACT OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND OWNERSHIP ON THE FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE OF FIRMS: THE EVIDENCE FROM EMERGING MARKETS
Dariusz Urban
Sovereign Wealth Funds have been regarded as investment vehicles established in order to 
manage, in a rational and profi t-oriented way, pools of national wealth for future generations. SWFs 
are among the most important fi nancial institutions in global fi nancial markets, and constitute a solid 
element in the architecture of the international fi nancial safety net. Similarly to other institutional 
investors, Sovereign Wealth Funds possess huge amounts of capital. What distinguishes them 
the most from other fi nancial institutions is the fact that they are owned, managed and controlled 
by sovereign states, have limited liquidity needs, a lower-than-market-average-level of redemption 
risk, a long-term, intergenerational investment horizon and relatively high risk tolerance. The 
question of whether investment from Sovereign Wealth Funds determines changes in corporate 
fi nancial performance of a targeted fi rm is still unanswered question in the literature. This study 
tests empirically the impact of Sovereign Wealth Funds’ ownership on the fi nancial performance 
of targeted companies. Using the data of companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, we 
employ regression to analyze the relationship between the funds’ investment and accounting, 
as well as the market outcomes of the fi rm. The empirical fi ndings of this research suggest that 
Sovereign Wealth Funds’ ownership has a positive infl uence on the price to book value of the 
fi rm. This article contributes to ongoing research in the fi eld of studies related to fi nancial aspects 
of SWF’s investment behavior. The empirical fi ndings of this research can also serve as a useful 
reference for companies and academics concerning themselves with investment decision making 
in emerging markets, as well as the role of institutional investors.
Key Words: Sovereign wealth funds, institutional investor, fi nancial performance, investing, 
emerging economies.
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